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SEX DISCRIMINATION-TITLE IX APPLIES TO EMPLOY-
EES-North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 102 S. Ct. 1912
(1982).
INTRODUCTION
Secton 901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972 provides that "no person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the bene-
fits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... I" Sec-
tion 902 authorizes each agency awarding federal financial
assistance to any education program to promulgate regulations en-
suring that aid recipients adhere to § 901(a).2 Section 902 also pro-
vides for termination of federal funds to an institution which does
not comply with the regulations.' The Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare (HEW)' issued regulations (Subpart E)'
prohibiting federally funded education programs from discriminat-
ing on the basis of sex with respect to employment.'
The regulations went into effect in 1975. Since that time sev-
eral school systems have challenged HEW's interpretation of "no
person," contending that "person" applies only to students.7
United States district courts and courts of appeals have disagreed
1. Title IX, § 901(a), 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
2. Title IX, § 902, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. 34 C.F.R. § 106.71, § 100.6-.11
(1981). These regulations initially appeared at 34 C.F.R. pt. 86, but were
recodified.
3. Id.
4. In 1979, HEW's functions under Title IX were transferred to the Depart-
ment of Education, but to avoid confusion, HEW will be used throughout this
note to refer to both agencies.
5. 34 C.F.R. Part 106, Subpart E (1980). Section 106.51(a)(1) provides: "No
person shall, on the basis of sex, .. . be subjected to discrimination in employ-
ment, or recruitment, consideration, or selection therefore, whether full-time or
part-time, under any education program or activity operated by a recipient which
receives or benefits from Federal financial assistance."
6. In Dougherty County School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735, 738 (5th Cir.
1980) the court indicated that a female employee is discriminated against if she is
paid less than a male employee for the same work.
7. See e.g. Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Junior College Dist. v. Califano, 597 F.2d 119 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
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on whether Title IX should be interpreted to prohibit employment
discrimination.8
Two Connecticut school boards brought separate suits chal-
lenging HEW's authority to issue Subpart E regulations,9 which
specifically include prohibition of discrimination in employment
under any education program operated by an institution which re-
ceives federal financial assistance."0 Both district courts granted
summary judgment in favor of the school board, invalidated
HEW's employment regulations, and enjoined HEW from interfer-
ing with the school boards' federal funds because of noncompliance
with those regulations." On appeal, the cases were consolidated."
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Ti-
tle IX was intended to prohibit employment discrimination and
finding the Subpart E regulations consistent with § 902."1 The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue." After care-
fully examining the statutory language of Title IX, the legislative
history of the provisions, and postenactment history of the statute,
the Supreme Court concluded, in North Haven Board of Educa-
tion v. Bell," that employment discrimination comes within Title
IX's prohibition and the Subpart E regulations are valid. The deci-
sion in North Haven should settle the issue of whether Title IX
applies to employees.
This note will examine the Court's rationale and the implica-
tions of the North Haven decision.
THE CASE
Two Connecticut public school boards brought separate suits
challenging HEW's authority to issue the Subpart E regulations."
8. E.g. Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979) (§ 901 does not include teachers); Islesboro School
Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979) (§
901 does not include employees); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629
F.2d 773 (2nd Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom., 450 U.S. 909 (1981) (employees
are included).
9. 34 C.F.R. Part 106, Subpart E (1980).
10. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Califano, No. 78-165, slip op. at 2 (D. Conn.
April 26, 1979).
11. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 775 (2d Cir. 1980).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 785-86.
14. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 450 U.S. 909 (1981).
15. 102 S. Ct. 1912 (1982).
16. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Califano, No. 78-165 slip op. at 2 (D. Conn.
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In North Haven, a female tenured teacher in the North Haven
public school system' 7 filed a complaint with HEW, alleging that
the North Haven Board of Education had violated Title IX by re-
fusing to rehire her after a one-year maternity leave.18 HEW began
to investigate the school board's employment practices and re-
quested from the board information concerning its policies on hir-
ing, leaves of absence, and tenure.19 The North Haven Board as-
serted that HEW lacked authority to regulate employment
practices under Title IX, refused to comply with HEW's request,
and brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the
Subpart E regulations exceeded the authority conferred on HEW
by Title IX and seeking an injunction forbidding HEW from at-
tempting to terminate the school district's federal funds.20 The
District Court granted North Haven's motion for summary judg-
ment, invalidated the employment regulations, and permanently
enjoined HEW from interfering with North Haven's federal funds
because of noncompliance with those regulations.'
In Trumbull, a female former guidance counselor in the Trum-
bull school district filed a complaint with HEW, alleging that the
Trumbull Board of Education had discriminated against her on
the basis of gender with respect to job assignments, working condi-
tions, and the failure to renew her contract.22 HEW notified the
Trumbull Board that it had violated Title IX and warned that cor-
rective action must be taken. 3 The Trumbull Board then filed suit
contending that HEW's Title IX employment regulations were in-
valid and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.24 The District
Court granted the board's motion for summary judgment and sub-
sequently amended the judgment, on Trumbull's request, to in-
clude injunctive and declaratory relief.25
The two cases were consolidated on appeal. The Court of Ap-
April 26, 1979).
17. The North Haven school system received federal funds for its education
program and was, therefore, subject to Title IX's prohibitions of gender discrimi-
nation. 102 S. Ct. at 1916.
18. 102 S. Ct. at 1916.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
1982]
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peals for the Second Circuit reversed." That court examined the
legislative history of § 901 and concluded that the provision was
intended to prohibit employment discrimination.27 The court also
found the Subpart E regulations consistent with § 902.8 The court
remanded the cases to the District Court to determine whether pe-
titioners had violated the HEW regulations and, if so, what reme-
dies were appropriate. Because this holding was contrary to that of
other federal courts which had invalidated the employment regula-
tions, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.' 9
The Supreme Court first examined the statutory language of §
901(a) in an effort to determine whether § 901(a)'s directive that
"no person" may be discriminated against on the basis of gender,
includes employees as well as students.80 The Court concluded that
employees were included since Title IX did not expressly include
or exclude employees. 1 The Court next exainined Title IX's legis-
lative history in order to determine whether Congress meant to in-
clude employees in § 901. After studying notes from the Senate
hearings and debates, in particular statements of Senator Bayh,
who introduced the legislation, the Court concluded that Congress
meant for employment discrimination to come within the prohibi-
tion of Title IX." Finally, the Court examined the postenactment
history of Title IX." The Court considered Senator Bayh's state-
ments after the legislation was enacted and studied HEW's proce-
dure in issuing the regulations as well as the public responses to
the legislation." The Court also noted that Congress had consid-
ered, but refused to pass, bills which would have amended § 901 to
prohibit its applicability to employment discrimination.5 The
Court again concluded that Congress meant Title IX to include
prohibitions against employment discrimination.8
26. 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980).
27. Id. at 786.
28. d. at 785.
29. 450 U.S. 909 (1981).
30. 102 S. Ct. at 1917.
31. Id. at 1918.
32. Id. at 1922-23.
33. Id. at 1923.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1925.
36. Id.
252 [Vol. 5:249
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BACKGROUND
Women as a class have been discriminated against throughout
history.3 7 The women's liberation movement in the late 1960s
made the public acutely aware of the extent of this discrimination.
Sex discrimination has been rampant in the educational field. 8 In
1970 a special House subcommittee on education held hearings on
gender discrimination in education. 9 Much of the testimony fo-
cused on discrimination against women in employment; however,
the proposal on which the hearings were held never emerged from
committee.'0 In 1972, Senator Bayh introduced a provision in the
Senate during debate on the Education Amendments of 1972.4"
Senator Bayh's amendment included provisions prohibiting gender
discrimination in federally funded education programs and provi-
sions extending the coverage of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act to
educational institutions.' Bayh's amendment was enacted as Title
IX.43
Pursuant to § 902 of Title IX, in 1972, HEW issued proposed
regulations prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex in educa-
tion-related programs and activities and in education-related em-
ployment, recruitment, compensation, and job classification."
Specifically, Subpart E prohibited discriminatory employment
practices in federally funded education programs. 45 A one-year
comment period was allowed during which nearly 10,000 formal re-
sponses were submitted." In June, 1975, HEW published its first
Title IX regulations and submitted them to Congress for review.'7
37. See Bayh, The ERA, 6 IND. L. REv. 1 (1972).
38. See Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on Section 805 of H.R.
16098 Before the Special Subcommittee on Education of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 & 2 (1970).
39. Id.
40. See 102 S. Ct. at 1919 n.13.
41. 102 S. Ct. at 1919.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 45 C.F.R. § 86.51-.61 (1975), now reissued in 34 C.F.R. § 106.51-.61
(1981).
45. Id.
46. 102 S. Ct. at 1923.
47. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975). Section 431(d)(1) of the General Education
Provisions Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(1) requires submission of the regulations to
Congress for review, to afford Congress an opportunity to examine the regulations
and disapprove them if found to be inconsistent with the Act from which they
derive their authority.
1982] 253
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While other portions of Title IX were amended, the Subpart E reg-
ulations were left undisturbed. 8 Senator Helms did introduce a
bill that in essence stated that § 901 would not apply to employ-
ees;' 9 however, no action was taken on the bill.
HEW's regulations sparked controversy and litigation. Much
of the controversy centered on the wording of § 901(a), which pro-
vides that "no person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance . . . ."5 The issue was whether these
regulations exceeded statutory authority. Four United States
courts of appeals held that HEW does not have the authority
under Title IX to regulate employment practices.5" The first of
these cases, Islesboro School Committee v. Califano,52 declared in-
valid an HEW regulation which required employers to pay disabil-
ity benefits to employees on pregnancy leave.53 The Court reasoned
that the "plain language" of § 901 did not encompass employees."
Romeo Community School v. HEW,"5 decided shortly after Isles-
boro, held that the words "no person" in § 901 are limited by the
later language 6 of the statute and concluded that § 901 covers only
persons discriminated against "under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance. '57 In support of its
conclusion, the Romeo court noted that other federal statutes were
designed to deal with employment discrimination," and, therefore,
Congress did not intend to create an additional remedy in Title
48. 102 S. Ct. at 1925.
49. 629 F.2d at 784.
50. Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
51. Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 972 (1979); Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Junior College Dist. v. Califano, 597 F.2d 119
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992
(9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom., 449 U.S. 1009 (1980).
52. 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
53. 45 C.F.R. § 86.57(c) (1980).
54. 593 F.2d at 426.
55. 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
56. Id. at 584 (quoting § 901, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976)). The later language is
"persons discriminated against 'under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.'
57. 600 F.2d at 584.
58. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976); Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)
(1976).
254 [Vol. 5:249
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IX.9 The courts in Junior College District v. Califano," and Seat-
tle University v. HEW61 relied heavily on the Islesboro and Romeo
decisions, simply stating that they agreed with the conclusions of
the above courts."'
In 1980, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in North Haven
Board of Education v. Hufstedler,6 became the first circuit court
to hold the disputed regulations valid. The court thoroughly ex-
amined the statute and its legislative history and concluded that
"Congress intended HEW to have available the potent remedy of
fund withdrawal to ensure compliance with the prohibition against
sex discrimination in employment . . . .""I The plaintiff school
board appealed and the United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to resolve the controversy.6 5
ANALYSIS
North Haven held that employment discrimination does come
within Title IX's prohibition and further held the Subpart E regu-
lations valid." In an opinion by Justice Blackmun, the Court be-
gan its analysis by examining the statutory language of Title IX.
The Court broadly interpreted § 901(a)'s directive that "no per-
son" may be discriminated against on the basis of gender, conclud-
ing that employees as well as students are included." The majority
indicated that a female employee who works in a federally funded
program is "subjected to discrimination under" that program if she
is paid less than a male employee for the same work or given less
opportunity for promotion."O Since the section neither expressly
nor impliedly excludes employees, the Court interpreted § 901(a)
as covering and protecting employees.69 Arguing that § 901(a) was
59. 600 F.2d at 584.
60. 597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
61. 621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom., 449 U.S. 1009 (1980).
62. 597 F.2d at 121; 621 F.2d at 994.
63. 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom., 450 U.S. 909 (1981).
Note that the defendant in this case is the Secretary of HEW. The Secretary
changed during this time, thus, the reason for different named defendants.
64. 629 F.2d at 785.
65. 450 U.S. 909 (1981).
66. 102 S. Ct. 1912.
67. Id. at 1917-18.
68. Id. at 1917. See Dougherty County School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. pending sub nom., Bell v. Dougherty County School Sys.,
No. 80-1023.
69. 102 S. Ct. at 1918.
1982] 255
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meant only to cover students, petitioners pointed out that the nine
exceptions listed in § 901(a) are directed only to students.70 The
Court countered by noting that two of the nine exceptions were
not concerned solely with students, but in fact, omitted a class of
institutions.
In a dissent by Justice Powell, the minority of three accused
the majority of paraphrasing the language and thereby misreading
the statute.72 The dissent argued that "[ilt tortures the language
chosen by Congress to conclude that. . teachers. . . who are dis-
criminated against on the basis of sex in employment are thereby
(i) denied participation in a program or activity; (ii) denied the
benefits of a program or activity; or (iii) subject to discrimination
under an education program or activity. ' 73 The dissent also dis-
counted the majority's strong reliance on the negative inference
drawn from the fact that § 901 does not expressly exclude employ-
ees.7 4 Neither of the arguments set forth by the dissent are very
persuasive for the following reasons. First, since "person" is not
defined, it should be given its ordinary meaning.75 Second, the ab-
sence of a specific exclusion for employees among the list of excep-
tions tends to indicate that Title IX's protection extends to em-
ployees of educational institutions.7 ' Finally, there is no indication
from the plain meaning of the Title IX language that employment
discrimination is not included in the statute."
After concluding its examination of the statutory language, the
Court examined the legislative history of Title IX, relying heavily
70. Id. Specific exceptions are made for: the admissions policies of schools
that begin admitting students of both sexes for the first time, § 901(a)(2); reli-
gious schools, § 901(a)(3); military schools, § 901(a)(4); the admissions policies of
public institutions of undergraduate higher education that traditonally and con-
tinually have admitted students of only one gender, § 901(a)(5); social fraternities
and sororities, and voluntary youth service organizations, § 901(a)(6); Boys/Girls
State/Nation conferences, § 901(a)(7); father-son and mother-daughter activities
at educational institutions, § 901(a)(8); and scholarships awarded in "beauty"
pageants by institutions of higher education, § 901(a)(9).
71. Secton 901(a)(2) exempts religious schools and § 901(a)(3) exempts mili-
tary schools.
72. 102 S. Ct. at 1928.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1930.
75. Id. at 1918 n.10.
76. Id. at 1918.
77. Comment, Administrative Regulation of Employment Practices under
Title IX, 61 B.U.L. REv. 799, 807-08 (1981).
[Vol. 5:249
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on statements made by the sponsor of the bill, Senator Bayh. In a
description of § 901(a), Senator Bayh stated that "[t]he amend-
ment would cover such crucial aspects as admission procedures,
scholarship, and faculty employment .... -7' During a Senate de-
bate, Senator Pell asked about the scope of the amendment; Sena-
tor Bayh replied, "We are dealing with discrimination in admission
to an institution, discrimination of available services or studies
within an institution once students are admitted, and discrimina-
tion in employment within an institution, as a member of a faculty
or whatever. 1'7 9 Senator Bayh's statements indicate that he in-
tended employees to be protected under the statute, and the views
of the sponsor of legislation are entitled to significant weight."°
The original House amendment had excluded employment,
but the Conference Committee noted in its report that since the
Senate amendment did not exclude employees, the House would
recede.8' The majority concluded that this conscious omission sug-
gests that Congress intended § 901 to prohibit sex discrimination
in employment.8 2
Petitioners argued that a specific exclusion for employment
was unnecessary since Title IX was patterned after Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,83 a statute limited in its scope to discrimi-
nation against beneficiaries of federally funded programs, not gen-
eral employment practices of fund recipients." The majority indi-
cated that petitioners' and the dissent's reliance on the history of
Title VI was misplaced and reiterated that if Congress had in-
tended that Title IX be parallel to Title VI, it would have enacted
counterparts to Title VI's exclusion of employment. 8 The major-
ity's approach appears to be more sound, since Congress could eas-
ily have drafted an employment exclusion if it had not intended
for employees to be included.
78. 102 S. Ct. at 1919; 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972).
79. 118 Cong. Rec. at 5812.
80. Because the sponsor of a bill should be well informed about the bill's
purpose and intended effect, courts give substantial weight to the sponsor's inter-
pretations. See, e.g., U.S. v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 69 n.255 (2d Cir. 1977) ("It is, of
course, well-established that the sponsor's interpretation of his proposal, when
expressed prior to adoption of the legislation, is entitled to great weight".)
81. 102 S. Ct. at 1921. See S. CONF. REP. No. 798, 92nd Cong., 221 (1972).
82. 102 S. Ct. at 1921.
83. Id. at 1922.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1976).
85. 102 S. Ct. at 1922.
1982]
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The Court concluded its analysis by examining the post-enact-
ment history of Title IX. Shortly after Title IX was passed, Sena-
tor Bayh published a summary of the bill in the Congressional Re-
cord.86 In this description, Senator Bayh stated that while Title VI
excludes employment from coverage, "[tihere is no similar excep-
tion for employment in the sex discrimination provisions relating
to federally assisted education programs. '87 Between the time
HEW published the proposed Title IX regulations and the final
regulations, HEW received nearly 10,000 comments from the pub-
lic. The Court pointed out that not one comment "suggested that §
901 was not meant to prohibit discriminatory employment prac-
tices."88 After HEW published its final Title IX regulations in
June, 1975, Congress had 45 days for review."' In both the Senate
and the House, bills were introduced to exclude employment from
Title IX, but neither bill was passed.90 The majority concluded
that the postenactment history lends credence to the interpreta-
tion that Congress intended to bar employment discrimination in
federally financed education programs. 9'
The Court agreed with the analysis of the Second Circuit.
While four other courts of appeals had examined the statutory lan-
guage and legislative history of Title IX,92 they had not thoroughly
examined Senator Bayh's remarks. And, as mentioned before, two
of the courts did not examine the statutory language and history
at all, merely relying on the first two decisions.93 The Second Cir-
86. 118 Cong. Rec. 24,684, n.1.
87. 102 S. Ct. at 1923; 118 Cong. Rec. 24,684, n.1 (1972).
88. 102 S. Ct. at 1923.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1924. Representatives Quie and Erlenborn introduced an amend-
ment to H.R. Con. Res. 330 that sought to disapprove the employment regulations
as inconsistent with Title IX. Senator Helms introduced a bill that would have
provided that nothing in § 901 would apply to employees of educational institu-
tions (S. 2146, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(1) (1975)).
91. 102 S. Ct. at 1925. The Court noted that although postenactment devel-
opments should not be accorded the weight of legislative history, where an
agency's statutory construction has been brought to the attention of the public
and Congress and the latter has not sought to alter that interpretation, presuma-
bly the legislative intent has been correctly discerned.
92. Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 972 (1979); Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Junior College Dist. v. Califano, 597 F.2d 119
(8th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992
(9th Cir.), cert granted sub nom., 449 U.S. 1009 (1980).
93. 597 F.2d at 121; 621 F.2d at 994.
258 [Vol. 5:249
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cuit was the first court to comprehensively examine legislative his-
tory and reach a sound decision.
The dissent argued that since Title VII and the Equal Pay Act
provided prohibitions of employment discrimination in educational
institutions on the basis of sex, Congress would hardly have en-
acted another statute addressing the same problem.94 In addressing
this issue, the majority, concluding that Congress could have in-
tended to create an additional overlapping remedy for employment
discrimination, stated that "this court repeatedly has recognized
that Congress has provided a variety of remedies, at times overlap-
ping to eradicate employee discrimination.' '95 Moreover, Title IX is
more comprehensive in scope than the Equal Pay Act and provides
a more potent remedy-fund termination to the institution-than
Title VII, when there are no money damages involved." The fund
termination remedy is especially effective in cases of sex discrimi-
nation on a large scale, thus, Title IX provides a useful remedy to
correct instances of institution-wide discrimination. 7
In Cannon v. University of Chicago,9" the Supreme Court rec-
ognized a private right to sue under Title IX. North Haven's result
now gives teachers and administrators a private cause of action to
insure that they will have a suitable remedy when discriminated
against by educational institutions receiving federal funds.
The North Haven decison will undoubtedly mean that cases
with contrary decisions, such as Department of Education v. Seat-
tle University," will be sent back to the appeals courts for recon-
sideration. The decision ends controversy over whether employees
are protected under Title IX and whether the Subpart E regula-
tions are valid and consistent with Title IX's program-specificity.
While the aforementioned portions of the decision would ap-
pear to be a total victory for female employees of educational insti-
tutions, the Court further held that an agency's authority under
Title IX to promulgate regulations and terminate funds is subject
94. 102 S. Ct. at 1933.
95. Id. at 1925, n.26.
96. See Note, Title IX Applies to Employment Discrimination, 1981 DuKE
L.J. 588, 605 (1981). Under Title VII the most potent remedy available is an in-
junction against the employer. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
97. See Note, Regulations under Title IX Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in
Education-Related Employment Held Valid, 56 N. D. LAWYER 528, 532 (1981).
98. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
99. 449 U.S. 1009 (1980).
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to the program-specific limitation of § 901 and § 902.100 The Sec-
ond Circuit indicated that under § 902, termination of funds
should be limited in its effect to the particular program in which
noncompliance is found, but implied that HEW's authority to is-
sue regulations was broader. 0 1 Thus, while the Supreme Court up-
held the HEW regulations, the decision also indicated that the reg-
ulations must be limited to programs or activities that receive
federal aid. 02 Consistent with this holding, if an employee is not a
participant in a federal grant program or her salary is not paid
from federal funds, she does not come under Title IX protection.
The Court remanded North Haven for a determination of whether
petitioners' employment practices actually discriminated on the
basis of gender and, if so, whether such discrimination comes
within the prohibition of Title IX. 1
0 3
While the Court concluded that "an agency's authority under
Title IX both to promulgate regulations and to terminate funds is
subject to the program-specific limitation of §§ 901 and 902,"1"
the Court did not undertake to define "program."10' Although
"program" has not been specifically defined, when the word "pro-
gram" is used in other places within Title 20, it usually refers to a
particular program, such as vocational guidance or remedial in-
struction.'" In a case dealing with racial discrimination under Ti-
tle VI, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that the phrase "program or
activity" did not include the "collectivization of all school subven-
tions under the single rubric, 'program or part thereof.' ,,1"
Another question left unanswered by the court is what types
of aid would be considered "federal financial assistance." While
there are no decisions on this point, the Education Department has
100. 102 S. Ct. at 1926. Section 902 provides that each Federal agency em-
powered to extend Federal financial assistance to any education program or activ-
ity is authorized to effectuate the provisions of § 901 with respect to such program
or activity.
101. 629 F.2d at 785-86.
102. 102 S. Ct. at 1926.
103. Id. at 1927.
104. Id. at 1926.
105. Id. at 1927.
106. See e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 241d-1 (1976) (programs designed to meet special
needs of "educationally deprived" children); 20 U.S.C. § 843(b)(3) (1976) (pro-
grams listed for educaton centers).
107. Bd. of Public Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1077 (5th Cir. 1969).
See Note, 56 N.D. LAWYER 528, at 535 for a discussion on the meaning of
"program."
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proposed to exclude from "federal financial assistance" federal dol-
lars received by an institution's students.10 8
CONCLUSION
North Haven upheld HEW's regulations (Subpart E) which pro-
hibit employment discrimination on the basis of sex in federally
funded education programs."0 9 From an examination of the statu-
tory language and legislative history of Title IX, the Supreme
Court concluded that employment discrimination does come
within Title IX's prohibition." 0 Contrary decisions from the vari-
ous district courts and courts of appeals will need to be reconciled.
In addition, the dozens of complaints filed with the Office of Civil
Rights which have been delayed pending North Haven can now be
settled.
While North Haven signals a victory for female employees in
educational institutions, the issue is not yet totally resolved. This
victory could be an empty one if other Title IX issues are not fa-
vorably settled. In fact, the Supreme Court's holding that an
agency's authority under Title IX to terminate funds is subject to
the program-specific limitation,"' limits employees protected by
Title IX to those employees in programs receiving federal
assistance.
The answers to two as of yet unanswered questions-what is a
"program or activity" and what type of aid is considered "federal
financial assistance"-are the key to the Title IX controversy. For
even though Title IX regulations protect employees, if the pro-
gram-specific limitation is construed too narrowly, few female em-
ployees will be protected. In the typical school, only a few employ-
ees are paid out of federal funds and this number will likely
further diminish with recent cuts in federal funds. In addition, if
money received by an institution's students is excluded from the
scope of "federal financial assistance," the bulk of federal dollars
received by institutions of higher education will be outside the
reach of the Title IX regulations. Thus, the answers to these two
questions can either expand the number of employees protected
under Title IX or diminish the number to a small, privileged few.
108. See Supreme Court Rules Title IX Bars Sex Bias Against College
Workers as well as Students, 24 CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDuc. No. 13, at 1 (1982).
109. 102 S. Ct. 1912.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1926.
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Analysis of the language of Title IX and its legislative history
reveals that Congress intended Title IX to prohibit employment
discrimination. While strides have been made to reduce sex dis-
crimination in education, discrimination is still prevalent. Even
though the Equal Pay Act" 2 and Title VII'I1 afford women some
protection, Title IX's added protecton serves to reinforce previous
legislation and offers female employees alternative remedies. "Con-
gress intended HEW to have available the potent remedy of fund
withdrawal to ensure compliance with the prohibition against sex
discrimination in employment rather than rely solely on the impor-
tant, but usually piecemeal, sanctions available to aggrieved em-
ployees under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act." 1 4
Barbara Hollingsworth
112. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (1976).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
114. 629 F.2d at 785.
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